Gianni Infantino’s attempt to bring private investors into FIFA’s commercial business triggered one of the most serious conflicts inside world football in years. The proposal was abandoned and the FIFA president publicly acknowledged mistakes, but the confrontation between the organisation’s leadership and some of the game’s most powerful confederations did not end there.
Fergana spoke to Alisher Aminov — a football analyst, lawyer and economist who previously stood as a candidate for president of the Russian Football Union — about the balance of power inside FIFA, Infantino’s prospects in the 2027 presidential election, the possibility of boycotts, legal risks and what he sees as a systemic crisis in world football governance.
This interview was originally published in Russian by Fergana on August 25, 2026.
Editor’s note: Two days after the original publication, UEFA provisionally suspended its threat to withdraw European teams from FIFA competitions after receiving written assurances that the FIFA Forward Enterprise project had been permanently abandoned. UEFA has nevertheless continued to demand an independent investigation and fundamental governance reform.
— The plan to transfer part of FIFA’s commercial business to private investors was abandoned after a fierce backlash, and Gianni Infantino publicly acknowledged mistakes. Can the conflict now be considered over?
— Its roots go much deeper than they may appear. The FIFA president’s apology is ultimately just words — one of the relatively simple diplomatic manoeuvres of which Infantino has many at his disposal.
The apology did not remove the fundamental contradictions because at least three major confederations — UEFA, CONCACAF and the AFC — formed a fairly consolidated position.
By unveiling his business plans, Infantino effectively exposed himself. He gave his opponents a direct opportunity to argue that the football world had grown tired of an authoritarian style of leadership.
Three of FIFA’s six confederations signed an open letter demanding changes in the organisation’s leadership. That is more than a serious demand for a change of power. The ultimate objective of the protest, in my view, is to isolate Infantino from football.
— How realistic is such a scenario?
— At the very least, it is realistic.
But believe me, this detective story has only just begun.
Infantino has no intention of going anywhere, and the mechanisms that allow him to control a significant part of the electorate remain in his hands.
We are heading into months of extremely tough political fighting. The next presidential election is due to take place at the FIFA Congress in Rabat in March 2027.
— What does the balance of power inside FIFA look like now?
— From the outside it appears fairly obvious. But we should understand that the fiercest political battles always take place backstage.
Smiles, handshakes and carefully chosen words have very little to do with the real state of affairs. A struggle for power is always brutal. Sometimes even bloody.
As I have already said, the coalition opposing Infantino consists of UEFA, CONCACAF and the AFC.
UEFA had already put one of its strongest cards on the table: a boycott of FIFA competitions if Infantino refused to withdraw his candidacy.
UEFA has 55 national associations, and one can assume that Aleksander Čeferin is capable of maintaining considerable internal unity.
France, however, is worth watching closely. Philippe Diallo’s federation has been playing a more ambiguous game. It has not openly joined the strongest calls against Infantino, but neither has it rushed to defend him.
I suspect there are many such “double agents” behind the scenes — both among smaller associations entirely dependent on external funding and among influential federations capable of pursuing their own agendas.
CONCACAF has 41 member associations, although only FIFA members vote at the FIFA Congress. It also appears relatively united, but Mexico and Grenada, for example, have expressed support for Infantino.
Mexico, as far as I understand, also has its own particular interests regarding closer integration with South American football. Sporting competition in CONMEBOL is obviously stronger, but matches against Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Colombia and the other leading teams also offer far greater commercial potential.
And reaching the World Cup through South America is no longer the mission impossible it once was, given the expanded tournament and CONMEBOL’s allocation.
The AFC is harder to read. The question is how many Asian associations will ultimately follow the political line of the confederation’s leadership and how many will align themselves with FIFA’s president.
We know that Asian football has never been politically straightforward.
— Which confederations can currently be regarded as Infantino’s supporters?
— CONMEBOL, with ten associations, and CAF, which represents 54 African associations.
The Oceania Football Confederation also recently held an executive committee meeting and issued a very elegantly drafted statement praising the “progress achieved by FIFA over the past decade”.
In political terms, that amounted to support for the incumbent president.
So the preliminary balance is close to a draw.
On paper, the two camps are almost evenly matched. But I stress again: that is the situation today and only in theory.
Confederations do not vote as blocs in a FIFA presidential election. National associations do.
— Africa has 54 FIFA members, almost as many as UEFA. How reliable is CAF’s support for Infantino?
— FIFA feeds African football generously, so the old principle of not biting the hand that feeds you might as well be written on CAF’s flag.
Africa is unquestionably the biggest trump card in Gianni’s deck.
CAF has formally backed Infantino, putting itself at odds with UEFA and CONCACAF. But African football is such a particular political environment that one inevitably recalls Anatoly Byshovets’ immortal phrase: “You would have to be a complete idiot to believe everything that is going on.”
There is absolutely no guarantee that every national association will ultimately follow the instructions of CAF president Patrice Motsepe.
— So divisions within African football are possible despite the confederation’s official position?
— I would call it less a possibility than a historical pattern.
In the 1998 FIFA presidential election, CAF officially supported Lennart Johansson, but many African associations voted for Sepp Blatter.
In 2002, when CAF president Issa Hayatou challenged Blatter, many African countries again supported the Swiss incumbent.
In 2016, CAF backed Sheikh Salman bin Ebrahim Al Khalifa, but numerous associations switched to Infantino in the second round.
And in the vote for the 2026 World Cup host, 11 CAF members broke with the confederation’s preferred Moroccan bid and voted for the United States, Canada and Mexico.
The situation today is roughly this: African associations collectively expressed support for Infantino earlier this year, before the details of his plan for the global commercial restructuring of FIFA competitions became public.
As far as I am aware, Infantino has since received direct expressions of loyalty from associations including DR Congo, Egypt, Mauritania, Morocco and Niger, and more indirect signals from Benin and Burundi.
On the other hand, some of the more politically sophisticated African federations have noticed the strength of the backlash against Infantino and adopted a wait-and-see position. They are looking for a credible alternative candidate.
— How does the FIFA presidential election work, and how many votes are needed to win?
— Elections take place every four years.
Infantino was re-elected without an opponent in 2019 and 2023, on both occasions by acclamation rather than through a contested ballot.
A potential candidate for the 2027 election must declare his or her candidacy by November 18.
FIFA has 211 member associations and each has one vote. If there are two candidates, victory requires more than half of the valid votes cast.
Confederations themselves do not vote as organisations, although their presidents automatically sit on the FIFA Council as vice-presidents.
So if Infantino can secure Africa, South America, Oceania and enough votes from a divided Asia, he has a viable path to re-election.
The key word is “if”.
And even if he keeps his post, UEFA retains an enormous source of leverage: European participation in FIFA competitions.
Without Europe, the World Cup would become something resembling a village tournament. The commercial consequences would be enormous.
Who would call whose bluff in such a scenario is an extremely interesting question.
But there is an even bigger issue.
What happens if the Swiss authorities decide to reopen legal questions surrounding Infantino and revive proceedings that have previously been closed?
In that case, the political arithmetic surrounding the election could become irrelevant. Depending on the nature and outcome of any proceedings, his ability to remain in office or stand for another term could come under direct pressure.
There is also a separate challenge involving presidential term limits.
The human rights organisation FairSquare has argued that another Infantino candidacy would violate FIFA’s three-term limit.
Infantino relies on a 2022 interpretation under which his first period in office, from 2016 to 2019, was excluded because he had been elected to complete the interrupted mandate of Sepp Blatter.
FairSquare argues that this is an unlawful loophole and that FIFA’s statutes provide no exception based on the length or circumstances of a presidential term.
That dispute could become extremely important.
— How serious do you consider the present crisis inside FIFA?
— I have given this assessment so many times, both in the Russian and international media, that I can only repeat myself.
In my view, the situation is approaching a critical point.
UEFA, CONCACAF and the AFC challenged FIFA’s governance and refused to accept the way the organisation was being run during the confrontation over the commercial project.
Questions surrounding committee participation and decision-making created serious institutional problems. Financial decisions made without properly functioning governance mechanisms can also create legal risks for those responsible.
The president himself has spent relatively little time at FIFA’s traditional headquarters in Zurich, while important parts of the organisation have increasingly operated elsewhere.
FIFA has been functioning on institutional inertia — effectively rowing without proper operational leadership.
In my opinion, the scale and potential consequences of the present crisis may ultimately eclipse FIFA-gate in 2015.
Back then, despite charges against more than 40 football officials, FIFA’s administrative machinery continued to function.
Today the problem goes deeper. It concerns the functioning and legitimacy of the governance system itself.
— What is the nearest event that could show how far the sides are prepared to go?
— The FIFA U-20 Women’s World Cup in Poland was the obvious first test.
At the time of our conversation, UEFA was threatening a boycott. If six or more leading European teams had pulled out of a 24-team tournament, it would have lost much of its sporting value and international appeal.
My expectation was that it was too early for either side to declare total war, and that FIFA and UEFA would reach some kind of temporary truce allowing the tournament to proceed.
There is also another front: the clubs.
European Football Clubs, the organisation representing hundreds of leading clubs, has demanded a joint venture with FIFA giving clubs real authority over commercial and operational matters concerning FIFA club competitions.
The clubs had threatened to withhold their support from future Club World Cups unless such an agreement was finalised.
They have also demanded detailed financial information concerning the previous Club World Cup and progress on the $250 million solidarity commitment for clubs that did not participate.
That is extremely significant.
The confrontation is no longer simply FIFA versus the confederations. Clubs have become an independent political force with enormous leverage.
Without the clubs and their players, FIFA’s global competitions cannot function.
— Why is Saudi Arabia receiving so much attention in discussions about the current crisis?
— The answer is very simple: money.
The relationship between FIFA and Gulf investors has existed for years. It began developing rapidly after Infantino came to power and has steadily strengthened its position behind the scenes.
There have been previous attempts to bring vast amounts of private capital into FIFA’s commercial business.
At one stage, a group of investors from the Arab world discussed a deal worth around $25 billion involving FIFA’s commercial rights, without the normal involvement of the FIFA Council.
That plan eventually collapsed amid internal disagreement and resistance from UEFA.
Over the past eight to ten years, Gulf states have invested enormous sums in Asian football and taken a commanding role in the commercial ecosystem surrounding many AFC competitions.
A significant number of Asian associations depend heavily on external funding.
Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has invested extraordinary amounts in the Pro League through the recruitment of global stars.
Cristiano Ronaldo is merely the most obvious example. The list has included Sadio Mané, Neymar, Karim Benzema, N’Golo Kanté, Roberto Firmino and many others.
But money itself does not play football.
An extensive model based on huge financial injections has not yet automatically produced a comparable sporting effect.
During a private conversation I had with Roberto Mancini at the Asian Cup in Qatar in January 2024, when he was still coaching Saudi Arabia, he expressed frustration with the country’s football management system and did not conceal tensions with senior officials, including Yasser Al-Misehal.
— Another serious problem in modern football is the overloaded international calendar. How closely is that connected to FIFA’s policies?
— The problem is extremely serious.
Football authorities have spent years expanding competitions.
The European Championship grew to 24 teams. The World Cup expanded to 48, with a 64-team format also discussed. The Club World Cup moved to 32. UEFA’s main club competitions now have 36 teams in their league phases.
Elite footballers can be required to play an extraordinary number of matches over a season when club and international commitments are combined.
That is not only a direct threat to their physical and mental health. It also damages the quality of football itself.
Infantino, with Arsène Wenger playing an important role in the project, previously promoted the idea of holding the World Cup every two years.
The proposal met fierce resistance.
UEFA president Čeferin did not even want the matter put to a vote, warning of disastrous consequences.
The objections were obvious: calendar congestion, the devaluation of major titles and clashes with events such as the Olympic Games.
Football cannot continue adding competitions indefinitely simply because every extra match creates another commercial product.
At some point, the product itself deteriorates.
— You have been involved in investigations and discussions concerning Infantino. How relevant are his previous legal problems today?
— The FIFA president’s name has appeared in various investigations and governance controversies for years.
Criminal proceedings were previously opened in Switzerland concerning undisclosed meetings between Infantino and former Swiss attorney general Michael Lauber. Those proceedings were later closed.
Other controversies concerned private jet travel and questions surrounding meetings with football officials.
Special prosecutor Stefan Keller, who investigated the Infantino-Lauber meetings, was subsequently removed from the case following court decisions concerning public statements he had made.
But that entire legal history becomes politically relevant again whenever a new governance crisis erupts.
Any renewed legal process could completely change the balance of power before the election — or after it.
Irrespective of the eventual outcome, the very existence of serious proceedings against a sitting FIFA president would alter the political landscape.
There are also questions surrounding the benefits provided to Infantino by FIFA.
Swiss media have reported that FIFA paid costs connected with accommodation used by Infantino in Paris and the Swiss canton of Zug, as well as private education expenses for his daughter in Miami and private air travel.
FIFA has defended benefits provided to its president as part of his contractual remuneration and working arrangements.
But in the context of a governance crisis, every such arrangement inevitably attracts additional scrutiny.
— Infantino now spends much of his time in the United States. Why have his moves — and the relocation of parts of FIFA — attracted so much attention?
— Before that, he lived in Qatar. Blatter called him a “refugee” for a reason.
No previous FIFA president had so visibly relocated himself to the country or region hosting a forthcoming World Cup.
At the same time, important parts of FIFA’s central administration have moved away from Zurich.
Some departments and functions have relocated to Paris and Miami.
That matters because FIFA is historically, legally and institutionally rooted in Switzerland.
When an organisation of this size starts dispersing its central structures across different countries, people inevitably ask whether this is simply an operational decision or part of a much more fundamental transformation.
There is also renewed legal pressure from Michel Platini.
In June 2026, Platini filed a criminal complaint in France against Infantino and several other figures, alleging offences including influence peddling in connection with the events surrounding Platini’s removal from football politics a decade ago.
Those are allegations that must be tested through the legal process.
But politically, their existence is important.
— Looking back at Infantino’s rise to power, what do you regard as the defining features of his management model?
— The story is as ordinary as it is murky.
In 2015, anti-corruption investigations by Swiss prosecutors and the US Department of Justice triggered the biggest crisis in FIFA’s modern history and ultimately ended Sepp Blatter’s presidency.
Michel Platini was widely regarded as the favourite to succeed him.
He was one of the greatest players in football history and by then an experienced administrator.
Infantino was UEFA’s general secretary. Had Platini become FIFA president, Infantino’s own career prospects would have looked very different.
Then came the investigation into the two-million-Swiss-franc payment made by FIFA to Platini.
Both Blatter and Platini were removed from football politics, and in February 2016 Infantino became president of FIFA.
From his first days in office, he began operating in a way that, in my view, contradicted several of the fundamental principles FIFA claimed to have adopted after its previous crisis.
The principle of collective decision-making was gradually weakened.
At the FIFA Congress in Mexico, Fatma Samoura was appointed secretary general. She was an experienced international administrator but had essentially no background in professional football.
The independence of FIFA’s ethics structures also came under pressure.
At the 2017 Congress in Bahrain, Cornel Borbély and Hans-Joachim Eckert — key figures in FIFA’s post-2015 reform and ethics system — were not reappointed.
Their removal was widely regarded as political.
The new rules — or rather, the growing absence of effective restraints — inevitably began to influence confederations and national associations as well.
In my view, Infantino repeatedly interfered in presidential elections and political processes within football, supporting people whose election suited his interests.
There is considerable irony in the fact that Infantino himself supported Čeferin’s rise to the UEFA presidency in 2016.
At the time, Čeferin was relatively little known outside European football politics.
The calculation appeared to be that UEFA would have a weak and manageable president.
Years later, that relationship has turned into an open confrontation that could ultimately push Gianni to the margins of football history.
There are dozens of comparable political stories.
Ahmad Ahmad, Infantino’s African ally and a former fisheries minister in Madagascar, defeated Issa Hayatou for the CAF presidency. In 2019 he was detained by French authorities in connection with a corruption investigation and was subsequently sanctioned by FIFA’s ethics bodies.
Alejandro Domínguez rose rapidly from Paraguayan football to the presidency of CONMEBOL and became another important figure in FIFA’s political system.
The point is not that alliances are unusual. FIFA politics has always been built around alliances.
The difference is the extent to which personal political loyalty has become central to the accumulation and preservation of power.
— The expression “Norwegian revolt” has appeared in discussions surrounding FIFA. What does it mean?
— It comes from growing resistance to FIFA’s handling of decisions such as the allocation of the 2030 and 2034 World Cups.
The 2030 tournament is spread across six countries on three continents.
To me, it resembles an expanded and even more complicated version of the geographically dispersed Euro 2020.
The logistical problems are enormous.
For players and supporters, there is little worse than travelling repeatedly between countries and continents during the same competition.
The organisers face difficulties too, of course, but the financial carrot hanging in front of them is large enough to make governments and federations accept almost anything.
The 2022 World Cup in Qatar already created a precedent for fundamentally disrupting domestic football calendars.
The 2034 World Cup in Saudi Arabia presents the same problem again. Given the climate, Ramadan and the European club schedule, finding suitable dates is extremely difficult.
That is the background to what has been called the “Norwegian revolt”.
Norwegian Football Federation president Lise Klaveness has become one of FIFA’s most outspoken internal critics, repeatedly raising questions about governance, transparency, human rights and the way major decisions are taken.
The Nordic football associations subsequently went further, publicly declaring that they had lost confidence in Infantino’s leadership and calling for fundamental reforms.
This is important.
Criticism is no longer coming only from journalists, activists or people outside the system.
It is coming from FIFA’s own members.
— Can changing FIFA’s president alone change the system?
— The system is far bigger than the intentions, personality and plans of one president or one presidential candidate.
Two of the most powerful executives in world football, Blatter and Platini, were removed from the game amid corruption-related proceedings, although both were ultimately acquitted in the Swiss criminal case concerning the disputed payment to Platini.
Infantino’s presidency has also been accompanied by repeated governance controversies and legal scrutiny.
So if the next FIFA president is simply another product of the same political machine, expecting serious change would be naive.
A real opportunity for reform would emerge only if an outsider appeared with a comprehensive programme for restructuring and developing FIFA.
The problem is that I do not currently see many people inside the national associations with the necessary scale and authority.
The most frequently mentioned potential candidate is CONCACAF president Victor Montagliani.
But Montagliani is an experienced political operator. He is not going to jump into the fire unless he believes he can win.
He has already learned how dangerous football elections can be.
When he was elected CONCACAF president in 2016, he received 25 of the 41 votes and came through what was a much closer political battle than many people remember.
The opposition therefore has only a few months in which to identify a candidate capable of genuinely challenging the incumbent.
That is an extremely difficult task.
— What qualities would a candidate need to mount a serious challenge to Infantino?
— The criteria are perfectly understandable.
A genuine candidate needs a deep understanding of FIFA’s systemic problems, experience inside football institutions, a history of opposing the system, and the ability to present a credible programme and persuade national association presidents that he or she can actually deliver it.
But such qualities and achievements are built over years.
Professional authority cannot be bought.
It cannot be manufactured for an election campaign.
Either you have it or you do not.
— If we move away from individual personalities and look at FIFA’s governance structure itself, where do you see the fundamental problem?
— In a structural conflict of interest.
The wellbeing of FIFA executives and national association leaders depends on the very people and structures they are supposed to regulate and reform.
It is a closed circle.
Football government functions less like a professional community and more like a political cartel with an extraordinary concentration of power.
It is closed to society and resistant to genuinely independent scrutiny.
FIFA is targeting revenues of $14 billion for the 2027–2030 cycle.
That commercial power allows its leadership to accumulate enormous political influence and preserve it despite repeated scandals and serious questions about governance.
Ten years ago, FIFA under Infantino promised the world reform, transparency and accountability.
Instead, in my view, it produced a new system of dependencies — from financial dependence to political dependence.
— So Infantino’s apology over the failed commercial project is not enough to resolve the underlying conflict?
— Exactly.
The system does not need apologies.
It needs reconstruction.
The electoral system is one of the first things that should be reconsidered.
The most important positions in world football should not be monopolised by officials who spend their entire careers circulating between confederations and national associations.
The game’s genuine stakeholders — players, clubs and referees — need much stronger representation in football governance.
But there is another problem.
Great footballers do not automatically become great administrators.
Many legendary players have no serious education in sports law, economics or governance. In practice, they have often ended up serving the same FIFA, confederation and federation bosses they were supposedly meant to challenge.
That is where the cancer in football governance began to spread.
And unless that structure changes, simply changing the name on the president’s office door will not be enough.